In house allocation problems, we look for a systematic way of assigning a set of indivisible objects, e.g. houses, to a group of individuals having preferences over these objects.
Introduction
A house allocation problem is a one-sided matching problem, where a set of agents collectively own a set of indivisible goods, e.g. houses, and every agent has strict preferences over these indivisible goods. The number of agents and the number of houses are assumed to be finite and equal. An allocation is an assignment of the houses to the agents, such that each agent receives exactly one house. Assignment of dormitory rooms or offices at the beginning of the academic year are examples of house allocation problems.
The house allocation model is closely related to the housing markets introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974) . The only difference between the two classes is that, in the latter, each agent owns one house, whereas in the former, houses are owned collectively. The housing markets have been thoroughly investigated and many strong results have been obtained concerning the core (competitive) correspondence. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that the core correspondence is singlevalued and Roth (1982) shows that it is strategyproof. Ma (1994) shows that the core correspondence is the only correspondence that is Pareto optimal, individually rational and strategyproof. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) introduce the core from random endowments as a lottery mechanism for house allocation problems. They show that the core from random endowments is equivalent to random serial dictatorship, which formally establishes the close relationship between the two models 1 .
In the context of house allocation problems, a correspondence is a map that chooses a set of allocations for each problem. A rule is a singlevalued correspondence. In this paper, we identify various classes of consistent and conversely consistent correspondences. Informally, consistency requires that, if an allocation is chosen for a problem, then for any subgroup of agents, the restriction of that allocation should be chosen for the smaller problem consisting of that subgroup and their original assignments. Consistent rules are coherent in their suggestions for problems involving different groups of agents. For example, in n-person bargaining problems, a rule that selects the egalitarian outcome when n equals 2 and a dictatorial outcome when n is greater than 2, is quite implausible because it is not consistent. The consistency 1 Also see Zhou (1991) , Svensson (1997) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999) for more exposition to the house allocation and the housing market models.
principle has been analyzed in many contexts, such as game theory, public finance, and fair allocation. 2 As we illustrate in the next paragraph, consistent rules also have a very practical appeal in classes of resource allocation problems where individuals are likely to receive their material allocations sequentially. Examples of such classes are two-sided matching, rationing and house allocation problems. In economies with indivisible goods and money, Tadenuma and Thomson (1991) identify the correspondences that satisfy no-envy and variants of consistency, neutrality, and converse consistency. In a large class of two-sided matching problems, Sasaki and Toda (1992) show that the stable correspondence (the core) is the only correspondence that satisfies Pareto optimality, anonymity, consistency, and converse consistency. Moulin (1999) investigates consistent rules in the context of rationing problems.
In the house allocation model, consistency requires that once an allocation is chosen and a group of agents take their assigned houses before the others, the allocation rule should not change the assignments of the remaining agents in the reduced problem involving the remaining agents and houses. For example, suppose that a rule assigning dormitory rooms to students is not consistent. Then, if some students occupy their rooms before the others, the rule may require a change in the assignments of the remaining students! Such a change would not only impose operational and transactional costs, but it would also lead the agents and the authorities to question the plausibility of the rule. Consistent rules are robust to non-simultaneous allocations of the houses. Therefore, we believe that consistent rules are more likely to emerge than 'inconsistent' rules.
In a problem where every agent has the same preferences over the houses, every allocation discriminates between agents. Indeed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between allocations and priority orderings over the set of individuals, illustrating the impossibility of equal treatment of equals in this class of problems. For this reason, "sequential solutions" and "serial dictatorships" constitute a powerful class of rules when randomization or monetary compensations are not allowed. Given an exogenous priority ordering which may for example be based on seniority, a serial dictatorship rule sequentially assigns every agent his most preferred house while respecting earlier assignments. Sequential solutions are a more general class 2 A comprehensive survey of consistency for resource allocation problems can be found in Thomson (1996) . of rules where certain agents receive their least preferred house when their turn comes. Simple sequential solutions are consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral. In Theorem 1, we show that simple sequential solutions are the only rules that satisfy a weak form of consistency and a weak form of neutrality, namely pairwise consistency and pairwise neutrality. Simple serial dictatorships are Pareto optimal, strategyproof, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral.
In Corollary 1, we show that simple serial dictatorships are the only rules that are weakly Pareto optimal, pairwise consistent, and pairwise neutral. Besides its descriptive nature, Theorem 1 can be interpreted as a negative finding, since dropping efficiency does not allow us to recover rules having other properties of normative interest. Then, we drop singlevaluedness.
In Proposition 5, we show that anonymous correspondences are not very appealing even in the multivalued case. In Corollary 2, we characterize Pareto optimal, consistent, and conversely consistent correspondences via their behavior in two-person problems. Finally, in Theorem 2, we show that a correspondence is nonempty valued, Pareto optimal, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral if and only if it can be written as a union of serial dictatorships in a particular manner. Precise definitions of the above concepts are provided in the next section.
The third section contains the results and the fourth section presents the concluding remarks.
The independence of axioms and part of proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Environments
Let N be a set of potential agents and H a set of potential houses such that |N | ≥ 3 and |H| ≥ 3. A house allocation problem or simply a problem is a triplet E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) where ∅ = N ⊂ N , ∅ = H ⊂ H, |N | = |H| is finite, and for each i ∈ N , R i is a linear order on H representing agent i's preference over the houses in H. 3 For each i ∈ N , P i denotes the asymmetric part of R i . 4 Given a problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ), an allocation µ : N → H is a bijection, where µ(i) 3 A binary relation Ri on H is a linear order if it is reflexive (∀a ∈ H : aRia), complete (∀a, b ∈ H : a = b =⇒ aRib or bRia), transitive (∀a, b, c ∈ H : aRib and bRic =⇒ aRic) and antisymmetric (∀a, b ∈ H : aRib and bRia =⇒ a = b). Indifference between different houses is not allowed. 4 For any a, b ∈ H, we say aPib if and only if aRib and not bRia. In general, a relation Pi on H is asymmetric if for any a, b ∈ H, aPib implies not bPia.
denotes the house assigned to agent i.
Let E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) be any problem, µ any allocation for E and i, j ∈ N any two agents. We say that i envies j under µ if µ(j) P i µ(i).
An allocation correspondence, or simply a correspondence, is a map ϕ which associates with each problem a possibly empty set of allocations for that problem. An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a map ϕ which associates with each problem exactly one allocation for that problem. A rule is a singlevalued correspondence.
Given a problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ), an allocation µ for E weakly Pareto dominates another allocation µ for E if every agent in N is weakly better off and at least one agent is strictly better off under µ than under µ. The allocation µ strongly Pareto dominates µ for For any problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ), any ∅ = N ⊂ N and any allocation µ for E, the reduced problem of E w.r.t. N at µ is:
where µ(N ) is the set of remaining houses after the agents in N \ N have left with their assigned houses, and R i | µ(N ) is the restriction of agent i's preference to the remaining houses.
The reduced allocation w.r.t. N , µ N : N → µ(N ) is the bijection defined by µ N (i) = µ(i),
A correspondence ϕ is consistent if for any problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ), any ∅ = N ⊂ N and any µ ∈ ϕ(E), one has µ N ∈ ϕ(r µ N (E)). Note that the union of consistent correspondences is consistent. A correspondence ϕ is pairwise consistent if for any problem
It is conversely consistent if for any problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) with |N | ≥ 2 and any allocation µ for E such that for any N ⊂ N with |N | = 2 we have µ N ∈ ϕ(r µ N (E)), we have µ ∈ ϕ(E). 6 By changing set memberships to equalities, one obtains the definitions of consistency, pairwise consistency and converse consistency for rules. 5 Since agents have strict preferences, given a linear order , a subset M ⊂ N and a problem E, there exists a unique sequential allocation induced by |N and M ∩ N for E. Therefore, ϕ ,M is well defined as a rule. 6 An alternative definition of converse consistency would require that if for any proper subset N of N with |N | ≥ 2, one has µ N ∈ ϕ(r µ N (E)) then µ ∈ ϕ(E). These two definitions turn out to be equivalent in Anonymity requires that a correspondence should be independent of the names of the agents. More precisely, a correspondence ϕ is anonymous if for any ∅ = H ⊂ H, any two
Neutrality requires that a correspondence should be independent of the particular labeling of the houses. More precisely, a correspondence ϕ is neutral if for any ∅ = N ⊂ N , any two
. By changing the quantifier "for any ∅ = N ⊂ N " to "for any N ⊂ N with |N | = 2", we obtain the definition of pairwise neutrality.
Results
Thomson (1998) points out that the Pareto correspondence is consistent in allocation problems where goods are privately appropriable. We start by noting this in our special context of house allocation problems.
Proposition 1 The Pareto correspondence is consistent.
The following proposition asserts that the Pareto correspondence is not conversely consistent. It is analogous to Tadenuma and Thomson's (1991) result about the lack of converse consistency of the Pareto correspondence in economies with indivisible goods and money.
the context of house allocation problems. It is straightforward to check the equivalence of these definitions via induction on the number of players, by using the following two transitivity properties of reduction: if
is a problem and µ is an allocation for E then r
and (µ N ) N = µ N . By using the same properties, one can also show that pairwise consistency and converse consistency imply consistency. The latter statement is a direct consequence of Lemma 2. Thomson (1996) points out that in any class of allocation problems where admissible problems involve finitely many agents and reduction is transitive, the two forms of converse consistency are equivalent.
Proposition 2
The Pareto correspondence is not conversely consistent. The weak Pareto correspondence is neither pairwise consistent nor conversely consistent.
Proof Let 1, 2, 3 be three distinct potential agents and a, b, c three distinct potential houses. To see that the Pareto correspondence is not conversely consistent, consider the following problem E:
Let µ be the allocation corresponding to the underlined selection. Note that for any {i, j} ⊂ {1, 2, 3} with i = j, the allocation µ {i,j} is chosen by the Pareto correspondence in the reduced problem r µ {i,j} (E). Thus, if the Pareto correspondence were conversely consistent, then µ should be in the set of Pareto optimal allocations for E. However, µ is strongly and therefore weakly Pareto dominated in E, so it is not in the Pareto correspondence for E, showing that the Pareto correspondence is not conversely consistent. The same example shows that the weak Pareto correspondence is not conversely consistent.
To see that the weak Pareto correspondence is not pairwise consistent, consider the following problem E:
Let µ be the allocation corresponding to the underlined selection. The allocation µ is not strongly Pareto dominated in E, therefore it is in the weak Pareto correspondence for E.
However, the reduced allocation µ {2,3} is strongly Pareto dominated in the reduced problem This idea is generalized to sequential solutions in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ), M ⊂ N and let be a linear order on N . An allocation µ for E is the sequential allocation induced by and M for E if and only if the following are true:
Proof Let E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ), M ⊂ N and let be a linear order on N .
First, assume that µ is the sequential allocation induced by and M for E. Let i ∈ N and j ∈ L(i, , N ). Since i j, j does not come before i in the sequential solution order.
Therefore, µ(j) is not previously allocated at the step when i receives his house. If i ∈ M , then µ(i) is the top-ranked house among the remaining ones w.r.t. R i , at the step when i's assignment is made. In particular, µ(i) R i µ(j). Similarly, if i / ∈ M , then µ(i) is the bottomranked house among the remaining ones w.r.t. R i , at the step when i's assignment is made.
In particular, µ(j) R i µ(i).
For the converse, assume that the allocation µ for E is such that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, let i k ∈ N be the k th person from the top in N w.r.t. . Let k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |} and a ∈ {µ
M , by Condition 2, we have that a R i k µ(i k ), and µ(i k ) is the bottom-ranked house in
ranked house in H. Otherwise, he receives his bottom-ranked house in H. At the k th step, if i k ∈ M , then i k receives his top-ranked house among those that are not already allocated in earlier steps, otherwise i k receives his bottom-ranked house among the remaining ones.
Therefore, µ is the sequential allocation induced by and M for E. 2 Proposition 3 Simple sequential solutions are consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral.
We omit the proof of Proposition 3 since it is straightforward using Lemma 1.
Proposition 4
Simple serial dictatorships are Pareto optimal, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral.
Proof By Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998), serial dictatorships lead to Pareto optimal allocations. Therefore, simple serial dictatorships are Pareto optimal. The other claims directly follow from Proposition 3. 2
Theorem 1 If a rule is pairwise consistent and pairwise neutral, then it is a simple sequential solution.
Proof Let ϕ be any pairwise consistent and pairwise neutral rule. Let a, b ∈ H be two distinct houses and i, j ∈ N two distinct agents. Let the problems E 1 and E 2 be as follows:
Depending on the values that ϕ takes (the underlined selections below) in the problems E 1 and E 2 , exactly one of the following four cases prevails:
•Case 1: i j
b a By the pairwise neutrality assumption, the four cases above are independent of the choice of houses a and b. Therefore, we have:
•Case 1: i j In any problem E involving i and j, i does not envy j under ϕ(E).
Indeed, suppose that there exists a problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) involving i and j, such that i envies j under µ = ϕ(E). Then, µ(j) P i µ(i), i.e. µ {i,j} (j) P i | µ({i,j}) µ {i,j} (i). In conjunction with the pairwise consistency of ϕ, this implies that one of the following cases prevails in the reduced problem r µ {i,j} (E):
where the underlined allocations represent ϕ's selection for the reduced problem. In either case, we obtain a contradiction to i j by setting a = µ {i,j} (j) and b = µ {i,j} (i).
•Case 2: i j In any problem E involving i and j, i envies j under ϕ(E).
Suppose that there exists a problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) involving i and j, such that i
. By pairwise consistency of ϕ, one of the following cases prevails in the reduced problem r µ {i,j} (E):
where the underlined allocations represent ϕ's selection for the reduced problem. In either case, we obtain a contradiction to i j by setting a = µ {i,j} (i) and b = µ {i,j} (j).
The two other cases are exactly symmetric. Since the four cases considered are independent of the choice of houses a and b, we can define a reflexive relation on N by letting i j if and only if i j or i j, for any two distinct i, j ∈ N . The relation is complete since one of the four cases prevails and it is antisymmetric since the four cases are mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is shown in the appendix that for any three distinct agents i, j, k ∈ N , the following implications hold:
i j and j k =⇒ i k and (i j and j k =⇒ i k) .
In particular, the relation is transitive. Therefore, is a linear order on N .
Let i ∈ N not be the minimal element 7 of N w.r.t. . Then, there exists k ∈ L(i, , N ) with i k. 8 Let j ∈ L(i, , N ) such that j = k and i j, then:
• i k =⇒ i j: Suppose that i k. If k j, we immediately have that i j. Otherwise if j k, suppose that it is not true that i j. But then since i j, we must have i j. Along with j k, this implies that i k, a contradiction. Therefore, i j.
• i k =⇒ i j: Suppose that i k. Similarly, if k j, we immediately have that i j.
Otherwise if j k, suppose that it is not true that i j. But then since i j, we must have i j. Along with j k, this implies that i k, a contradiction. Therefore, i j.
Therefore, we may validly define the set M ⊂ N as follows. If there exists a minimal element of N w.r.t. , let it belong to M. For any other i ∈ N , let i ∈ M if and only if i k for some-or for any k ∈ L(i, , N ) with i k.
µ(i) = µ(j) and therefore µ(i) R i µ(j) and µ(j) R i µ(i). Otherwise i = j, so we have i j.
In this case, if i ∈ N ∩ M then by construction i j, i.e. i never envies j, i.e. µ(i) R i µ(j).
Otherwise if i ∈ N \ M then by construction i j, i.e. i always envies j, i.e. µ(j) R i µ(i).
By Lemma 1, µ is the sequential allocation induced by | N and M ∩ N for E. Therefore, ϕ is the simple sequential solution induced by and M. 2
Corollary 1
If a rule is weakly Pareto optimal, pairwise consistent, and pairwise neutral, then it is a simple serial dictatorship.
Proof Let ϕ be a weakly Pareto optimal, pairwise consistent, and pairwise neutral rule. By Theorem 1, ϕ is a simple sequential solution, i.e. there exists and M ⊂ N such that ϕ = ϕ ,M . Suppose that ϕ = ϕ . Then there exists i ∈ N \ M such that i is not the minimal element in N w.r.t. . Let j ∈ N be such that i j and let the problem E be as follows:
7 For any i ∈ N , i is the minimal element of N w.r.t. , if for any j ∈ N , we have j i. For the case when N is finite, this is equivalent to saying that i is the bottom-ranked agent in N w.r.t. . By the antisymmetry of , there exists at most one minimal element of N w.r.t. .
Since i / ∈ M, under the allocation ϕ(E) = ϕ ,M (E), agents i and j receive b and a, respectively.
However, both are made strictly better off by exchanging their assigned houses, a contradiction to ϕ being weakly Pareto optimal. Therefore, ϕ = ϕ . 2
The Pareto correspondence is anonymous but not conversely consistent. The next proposition shows that there does not exist a nonempty valued correspondence that is weakly Pareto optimal, anonymous, and conversely consistent.
Proposition 5 Any nonempty valued, anonymous, and conversely consistent correspondence
is not weakly Pareto optimal.
Proof Let ϕ be a nonempty valued, anonymous, and conversely consistent correspondence.
Then, for any distinct i, j ∈ N and a, b ∈ H, the correspondence ϕ will choose both allocations from the problem:
since it is nonempty valued and anonymous. By converse consistency of ϕ, the underlined allocation µ will be chosen by ϕ from the following problem E:
Note that the allocation µ is strongly Pareto dominated in E, showing that ϕ is not weakly Pareto optimal. 2
For any correspondence or rule ϕ, let ϕ| 2 be its restriction to two-person problems. A correspondence ϕ is an extension of a correspondence ϕ defined for two-person problems if ϕ| 2 = ϕ. The following lemma states that consistent and conversely consistent correspondences are characterized by their restrictions to two-person problems.
Lemma 2 For any correspondence ϕ defined for two-person problems, there exists a consistent and conversely consistent extension ϕ that is unique up to one-person problems. 9 The extension ϕ is defined as follows. For any problem E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) with |N | ≥ 2 and for any allocation µ for E:
In particular, any consistent and conversely consistent correspondence ϕ is expressed as in above where ϕ = ϕ| 2 .
Proof Let ϕ be any correspondence defined for two-person problems. Let the correspondence ϕ be defined as in above for problems involving more than one person and W.L.O.G. let ϕ select the unique allocation in one-person problems. Since ϕ = ϕ| 2 , ϕ is conversely consistent showing the uniqueness of the extension up to one-person problems. 10 Any consistent and conversely consistent correspondence ϕ is in particular a consistent and conversely consistent extension of ϕ| 2 . By uniqueness of the consistent and conversely 9 In other words, if there exist two different consistent and conversely consistent extensions of ϕ, they would only differ in their selections from one-person problems. 10 The proof of the uniqueness part makes implicit use of the "Elevator Lemma" in Thomson (1998) . The
Elevator Lemma states that if ϕ|2 ⊂ ϕ |2, ϕ is consistent and ϕ is conversely consistent, then ϕ ⊂ ϕ up to one-person problems.
consistent extension of ϕ| 2 up to one-person problems, ϕ is expressed as in above where
For any correspondence ϕ defined for two-person problems, let Ext (ϕ) be the consistent and conversely consistent extension of ϕ selecting the unique allocation in one-person problems.
The correspondence Ext (ϕ) is uniquely defined by Lemma 2. For any two correspondences ϕ and ϕ defined for two-person problems such that ϕ ⊂ ϕ , we have Ext (ϕ) ⊂ Ext (ϕ ). In particular, if {ϕ α } α∈I is any collection of correspondences defined for two-person problems,
we have:
Moreover, for any linear order on N and any M ⊂ N , we have:
by Proposition 3 and Lemma 2.
Let { a,b } (a,b)∈H×H be an indexed family of relations on N . The family { a,b } (a,b)∈H×H is 3 + -acyclic if there do not exist distinct elements i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ∈ N and a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ H with n ≥ 3 such that i 1 a 1 ,a 2 i 2 a 2 ,a 3 . . . a n−1 ,an i n an,a 1 i 1 . 
Lemma 3 If a Pareto optimal and conversely consistent correspondence ϕ is such that ϕ| 2 is nonempty valued, then ϕ| 2 induces a 3 + -acyclic family of relations on N . Conversely, for any consistent correspondence ϕ such that ϕ| 2 induces a 3 + -acyclic family of relations on N and is Pareto optimal, the correspondence ϕ is Pareto optimal.
We defer the proof of Lemma 3 to the appendix. A restatement of Lemma 3 gives us the following characterization of Pareto optimal, consistent, and conversely consistent correspondences.
Corollary 2 A correspondence ϕ is nonempty valued in one and two-person problems, Pareto optimal, consistent, and conversely consistent if and only if ϕ = Ext (ϕ) for some nonempty valued and Pareto optimal correspondence ϕ defined for two-person problems that induces a 3 + -acyclic family of relations on N .
A relation on N is 3 + -acyclic if there do not exist distinct elements i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ∈ N with n ≥ 3 such that i 1 i 2 . . . i n i 1 . Any complete and 3 + -acyclic relation is transitive. A transitive relation is 3 + -acyclic if and only if its indifference classes are of size smaller than 3. For any complete and 3 + -acyclic relation on N , let ϕ be the nonempty valued, Pareto optimal and neutral correspondence defined for two-person problems, such that for any two distinct agents i, j ∈ N and any problem E of type: obtained by arbitrarily breaking indifferences in are depicted as follows:
We also have that
Lemma 4 A correspondence ϕ is nonempty valued, Pareto optimal, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral if and only if there exists a reflexive, complete, and 3 + -acyclic relation on N such that ϕ = Ext ϕ .
We defer the proof of Lemma 4 to the appendix. The following theorem states that a correspondence is nonempty valued, Pareto optimal, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral if and only if it can be expressed as a union of simple serial dictatorships in a particular manner.
Theorem 2 A correspondence ϕ is nonempty valued, Pareto optimal, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral if and only if there exists a reflexive, complete, and 3 + -acyclic relation on N such that:
where { α } α∈I is the set of linear orders contained in .
Proof Let be any reflexive, complete, and 3 + -acyclic relation on N and let { α } α∈I be the set of linear orders contained in . We will show that
This will prove the theorem, by Lemma 4. We already know that
By showing that α∈I ϕ α is consistent and conversely consistent, we will have that α∈I ϕ α is a consistent and conversely consistent extension of ϕ , which will imply the desired equality, by Lemma 2. By Proposition 3, simple serial dictatorships are consistent. Therefore, α∈I ϕ α is consistent as a union of consistent correspondences. To see that α∈I ϕ α is conversely consistent, let E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) with |N | ≥ 2 and let µ be an allocation for E, such that for any N ⊂ N with |N | = 2, we have µ N ∈ α∈I ϕ α (r µ N (E)). So, for any {i, j} ⊂ N with i = j, we can choose α {i,j} ∈ I such that µ {i,j} ∈ ϕ α {i,j} (r µ {i,j} (E)). Hence, we can define a reflexive and complete relation on N , such that for any distinct i, j ∈ N , we have in all other problems. The rule ϕ is Pareto optimal and neutral. To see that ϕ is not pairwise consistent, consider the problem E depicted below:
Note that ϕ chooses the underlined allocation µ for E.
. Therefore, ϕ is not pairwise consistent.
(ii) Let : 1 2 3 and consider the simple sequential solution ϕ ,∅ . By Proposition 3, ϕ ,∅ is neutral and consistent. To see that ϕ ,∅ is not weakly Pareto optimal consider the following problem E:
where the underlined allocation ϕ ,∅ (E) is strongly Pareto dominated in E.
(iii) Let : 1 2 3 and : 2 1 3. At each E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ), define the allocation rule ϕ by ϕ(E) = ϕ (E) if 1, 2 ∈ N , a ∈ H and both 1 and 2 rank a in the top, and ϕ(E) = ϕ (E) otherwise. The rule ϕ is Pareto optimal, consistent, and conversely consistent. 11 Consider the underlined selections of ϕ from the following problems:
11 Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that for a large class of social choice functions, strategyproofness is equivalent to dictatorship. However, note that ϕ above is strategyproof but not dictatorial, showing that strategyproofness does not imply dictatorship in the context of house allocation problems. The rule ϕ is the
Let µ = ϕ(E) and µ = ϕ(E ). Agent 1 is assigned a under µ. Therefore, if ϕ is pairwise neutral, agent 1 should be assigned b under µ , but this is not the case. Thus, ϕ is not pairwise neutral.
Proofs
Proof (Part of Theorem 1) Let a, b, c ∈ H be three distinct houses and let i, j, k ∈ N be any three distinct agents. Then, i j and j k =⇒ i k:
Suppose that i j and j k. Then, in any problem involving i, j and k, we have that i
does not envy j and j does not envy k. Consider the following problem E and the underlined allocation µ:
Note that µ is the unique allocation for E under which i does not envy j and j does not envy k. Therefore, µ = ϕ(E). Consider the reduced problem r µ {i,k} (E):
By pairwise consistency of ϕ, the underlined selection µ {i,k} ∈ ϕ r µ {i,k} (E) . Therefore, either i k or k i.
Consider the following problem E and the underlined allocation µ:
variable population extension of a "hierarchical exchange function", introduced in Papai (1997) and of a "top trading cycles mechanism", introduced in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) .
By pairwise consistency of ϕ, the underlined selection µ {i,k} ∈ ϕ r µ {i,k} (E) . Therefore, either i k or k i. By the above paragraph, i k.
Similarly, one can show that (i j and j k =⇒ i k), (i j and j k =⇒ i k)
and (i j and j k =⇒ i k) which altogether imply that:
Proof (Lemma 3) Let ϕ be any Pareto optimal and conversely consistent correspondence such that ϕ| 2 is nonempty valued. Let { a,b } (a,b)∈H×H be the family of relations induced by ϕ| 2 on N . Suppose that there exist distinct elements i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ∈ N and a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ H with n ≥ 3 such that i 1 a 1 ,a 2 i 2 a 2 ,a 3 . . . a n−1 ,an i n an,a 1 i 1 . Consider the following problem E and the underlined allocation µ:
Note that for any two distinct integers l, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have that
But then, by converse consistency of ϕ, we have µ ∈ ϕ(E), a contradiction to ϕ being Pareto optimal and µ being Pareto dominated in E. Therefore, the family For the converse, let ϕ be any consistent correspondence such that ϕ| 2 induces a 3 + -acyclic family of relations { a,b } (a,b)∈H×H on N and is Pareto optimal. Suppose that ϕ is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists E = (N, H, (R i ) i∈N ) and µ ∈ ϕ(E) such that µ is weakly Pareto dominated by another allocation µ for E. We will show that there exists a cycle of agents and j ∈ N , we have that µ (π(j)) = µ (j) P j µ(j), i.e. j envies π(j) under µ. In particular, j = π(j) and j, π(j) ∈ N i , therefore, n = |N i | ≥ 2. Note that for any j = π l (i) ∈ N i and any positive integer k such that π k (j) = j, we have π k (i) = π −l •π k •π l (i) = π −l •π k (j) = π −l (j) = π −l •π l (i) = i. Then, N i = i, π(i), π 2 (i), . . . , π k−1 (i) , so k ≥ |N i | = n. Therefore, the agents i, π(i), π 2 (i), . . . , π n−1 (i) are all distinct, for otherwise there exists j ∈ N i and a positive integer k < n such that π k (j) = j, a contradiction. Then, we have N i = i, π(i), π 2 (i), . . . , π n−1 (i) .
Moreover, since π n (i) ∈ N i , by a similar argument, we can only have that π n (i) = i. Letting i k = π k (i) and a k = µ(i k ), we have that a 0 = a n P i n−1 a n−1 . . . a 2 P i 1 a 1 P i 0 a 0 . Moreover, for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, we have a k+1 P i k+1 a k , for otherwise there exists k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} such that a k P i k+1 a k+1 P i k a k . But then, by consistency of ϕ, the following underlined allocation is chosen by ϕ and hence by ϕ| 2 , from the reduced problem r µ {i k ,i k+1 } (E):
a k a k a k+1 a contradiction to ϕ| 2 being Pareto optimal. In particular, we have n ≥ 3, for otherwise, if n = 2, then a 0 = a 2 P i 1 a 1 , a contradiction to a k+1 P i k+1 a k for k = 0. Moreover, for every 12 Here, π k denotes the map π composed k times with itself and π −k = π −1 k . The map π 0 denotes the identity.
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, the reduced problem r µ {i k ,i k+1 } (E) is of the form:
where the underlined allocation is chosen by ϕ| 2 , by consistency of ϕ. But then, i 0 a 0 ,a n−1
i n−1 a n−1 ,a n−2 . . . Since this is true for any such N , by definition of ϕ, we have that π • µ ∈ ϕ(E ). Therefore, ϕ is neutral.
For the converse, let ϕ be a nonempty valued, Pareto optimal, consistent, conversely consistent, and neutral correspondence. By Lemma 2, ϕ = Ext (ϕ| 2 ) up to one player problems,
